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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY APPORTIONMENT 
AMONG MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS: A SURVEY, AND
PERSPECTIVES IN LARGE-SCALE RISKS MANAGEMENT
JULIEN JACOB* & BRUNO LOVAT**
I. INTRODUCTION
Many human activities, especially industrial processes, can cause 
damage to the environment: chemicals, energy supply, even the agro-food 
industry involves health risks. Because it can be difficult and/or costly for 
potential injury victims to avoid these risks, public regulation has been put 
in place in order to: 1) incite industries to engage in efforts to reduce the 
level of accident risk; and 2) compensate the victims in case of damage.
For industrial activities, one of the main regulatory tools in place is 
civil liability.1 Civil liability responds to the two goals of public regulation: 
it compels the injurers to compensate the victims in case of damage (via a
damages payment), and this threat of payment ex post provides incentives 
to engage in effort ex ante to reduce the probability of an accident occur-
ring.
However, most industrial activities require the involvement of several 
decision makers, who all have different and autonomous legal entities. 
When each of these decision makers has an impact on the overall level of 
risk, the efficiency of civil liability can be found wanting. Indeed, the total 
debt (to compensate victims) has to be shared among the different parties 
who have contributed to the occurrence of the damage. However, since the 
work of A.C. Pigou in The Economics of Welfare,2 economic theory has 
*BETA, CNRS – University of Lorraine. Julien.Jacob@univ-lorraine.fr.
**BETA, CNRS – University of Lorraine. Bruno.Lovat@univ-lorraine.fr. 
This research received support from the French National Research Agency (“Damage” project, 
program ANR-12-JSH1-0001, 2012-2015), and from the Regional Council of Lorraine (Conseil Ré-
gional de Lorraine).
1. Civil liability is not the only regulatory tool in place. Command and control systems are also 
in place, such as approvals (authorizations to operate, which are granted only if the firm is able to 
demonstrate its ability to adequately control the level of risk). Approvals can be combined with random 
in situ inspections once the firm is operating. See, e.g., Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, 40 
C.F.R. § 68 (1996).
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taught us that, in order to provide an agent with the incentive to optimally 
control the level of “nuisance” he produces (e.g., pollution, risk of accident, 
etc.), this agent must take into account the whole nuisance3 he causes. But 
when several agents contribute to a common damage, how can the debt of 
liability be shared efficiently?
To illustrate, consider the case of energy. Taking the example of gas 
power plants, the level of accident risk depends on the level of care provid-
ed by the operator (e.g. the frequency at which the gas pressure is con-
trolled). In a French illustration, the French national electricity manufactur-
er, Électricité de France (EDF), is the decision maker. But for a given level 
of care provided by the operator, the level of risk also depends on the relia-
bility of the production process (e.g., keeping with France, the reliability of 
the turbine provided by the French manufacturer Alstom). We can also use 
the agro-food industry as another example. The level of health risk depends 
on the level of care taken by the operator, such as the quality of the sterili-
zation process, for example. However, for a given level of care, the level of 
health risk also depends on the quality of inputs provided by suppliers, for 
example the food containers (i.e. their ability not to oxidize in contact with 
food).4
In this article we seek to address the optimal way of sharing a debt in 
liability for a common (and high) damage in which the different contribu-
tors have an impact on the likelihood of the damage occurring. We focus 
our analysis on the question of the efficiency of the sharing, i.e. sharing lia-
bility in order to provide each decision maker with efficient incentives to 
undertake sufficient efforts to optimally control the level of risk. We set 
aside other important questions, such as fairness issues (e.g. a sufficient 
level of compensation for the victims and fairness in the allocation of the 
debt between the different contributors).
The following analysis is developed more generally in Julien Jacob 
and Bruno Lovat’s article titled, Multiple Tortfeasors in High Risk Indus-
3. To be precise, the agent has to take into account the marginal (expected) damage he causes: 
for instance, if he expects to increase his level of activity, he has to (financially) take into account the 
increase in damage resulting from the increase in activity (e.g. he has to pay a tax corresponding to the 
damage caused by the increase in CO2 emissions).
4. We also could think of the controversy surrounding the use of Bisphenol A, which is suspect-
ed to be an endocrine disruptor. The suspected risks, related to exposure to endocrine disruptors, are 
long-term health risks. In this case, applying civil liability could face difficulties because of the difficul-
ty gathering sufficient evidence to prove the causal link between the exposure and the damage suffered. 
A first economic analysis of the incentives provided by civil liability in cases of long-term latent haz-
ards is provided by Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large Scale, Long-Term Haz-
ards, 98 J. POL. & ECON. 98, 574–95 (1990). A practical example reflecting the difficulty in enforcing 
civil liability in case of latent hazards is given by the Diethylstilbestrol (DES) case. See Caroline Politi, 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 117 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:19 PM
2016] LIABILITY APPORTIONMENT AMONG TORTFEASORS 661
tries: How to Share Liability?.5 First, we present the originality of our con-
tribution with respect to the literature on law and economics. We then pre-
sent our assumptions and the main results of our analysis, and show how 
our sharing rule could apply using a numerical example.
II. THE LITERATURE AND OUR CONTRIBUTION
Despite the wide range of applications, the economic literature on the 
optimal apportionment of liability is relatively scarce, and mainly North 
American.
In the United States, there are two main ways of sharing liability: us-
ing a joint-and-several liability rule or a non-joint liability rule. In each 
case, several injurers are liable for a common damage. In each case, each 
injurer has to pay a share of the common debt (this share is determined by 
the judge).6 The main difference between these two rules is the fact that li-
ability is joint in the first case and non-joint in the second. In a case of non-
joint liability, each injurer has to pay its share of liability to the limit of its 
level of assets.7 In cases of joint and several liability, the different contribu-
tors are jointly liable: if one contributor is financially unable to pay for a 
share of liability, the remaining debt has to be paid by the other (solvent) 
contributors. As a consequence, joint and several liability allows the vic-
tims to sue only one contributor and to claim the entire damage from this 
sole contributor. This contributor then has to sue the other contributors for 
their shares of the liability. By pursuing only one (highly solvent) contribu-
tor, joint and several liability leads to a decrease in litigation costs for the 
victims, who can more easily exercise their right to redress. Hence, joint 
and several liability is the default apportionment rule in the United States in 
cases of damage with multiple defendants.8
However, in the 1980s, a tort reform movement developed with the 
aim of restricting the application of joint and several liability to economic 
damage only (e.g. loss of gross revenue). Nowadays, in the United States, 
most states apply the rule of non-joint liability for non-economic damage, 
5. Julien Jacob & Bruno Lovat, Multiple Tortfeasors in High Risk Industries: How to Share Lia-
bility? (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée).
6. See infra section III.B. 
7. We assume that each injurer benefits from limited liability; they cannot pay more than their 
level of wealth/assets. As a consequence, if the amount of debt exceeds the level of wealth, a part of the 
debt remains unpaid.
8. Han-Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of Tort Fil-
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especially environmental damage.9 This change was introduced as a re-
sponse to the Liability Insurance Crisis which affected certain “hazardous” 
sectors (e.g. chemicals) in the United States during the 1980s; the applica-
tion of joint and several liability, combined with the increasing use of strict 
liability10 and the difficulty of assessing (and forecasting) environmental 
damage led to an unexpected increase in debts for environmental damag-
es.11 As a consequence, certain partners of these sectors decided to limit 
their exposure. Liability insurers excluded environmental damages12 and 
banks13 became more reluctant to grant loans.14 Nevertheless, the debate is 
still open in the United States; not all states enacted such tort reform, and 
some federal laws, like CERCLA, still use joint and several liability.15
In this debate, the law and economic literature has developed compar-
ative analyses between joint-and-several and non-joint liability, and/or has 
developed normative analyses aiming to find an optimal sharing rule (as 
mentioned before, we restrict our attention to the problem of providing op-
timal incentives to control the risk). A study of the literature on law and 
economics shows that the optimal way to share liability between multiple 
defendants is closely related to the characteristics of the situation to be reg-
ulated. Considering several contributors to a common damage (instead of 
only one injurer) leads to a multiplicity of possible situations to regulate. 
The situations can be differentiated according to three criteria: (i) the type 
of actions that may be undertaken by the decision makers; (ii) the chronol-
9. See Yiling Deng & George Zanjani, What Drives Tort Reform Legislation? Economics and 
Politics of the State Decisions to Restrict Liability Torts (Ga. State Univ. Dep’t of Risk & Ins. Working 
Paper, 2014); Lee et al., supra note 8, at 298. 
10. Negligence (i.e. liability is subject to a deviation from a standard of due care) still remains the 
default rule of liability. But for the case of environmental damages, strict liability (no need to demon-
strate a deviation from a standard to establish liability) is increasingly used. See, e.g., Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2011).
11. Strict liability is also increasingly used in cases of work exposures. Ringleb & Wiggins, supra 
note 4, at 574–95 (showing the underlying problems for the sectors which expose their workers to risks 
during the production process and how these industries react in order to reduce their own exposure to 
liability claims); see also Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environ-
mental Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75 (1998).
12. See Dan R. Anderson, Development of Environmental Liability Risk Management and Insur-
ance in the United States: Lessons and Opportunities, 2 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1 (1998).
13. Two reasons justify the reluctance of the banking sector. First, if liability insurers do not cov-
er certain risks, the expected liability debt for the firms is higher. As a consequence, the probability of 
default increases (especially environmental damages cases, which can be considered as senior debts). 
Second, some U.S. environmental laws, such as CERCLA, introduce an extension of liability to the 
financial partners; if the firm is unable to pay for the liability, the remaining damages can be claimed 
from the banks.
14. See Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms 
and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171 (1995).





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 118 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:19 PM
2016] LIABILITY APPORTIONMENT AMONG TORTFEASORS 663
ogy of actions; and (iii) the way in which the different actions combine to 
lead to the occurrence of the damage.
In Joint Liability in Torts: Marginal and Inframarginal Efficiency,
Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson distinguish two types of actions: bi-
nary actions (to engage or not engage in an activity),16 or the choice of a 
degree of effort within a continuum of possibilities (e.g., which degree of 
care to exert).17 The two types of actions do not lead to the same method of 
optimally sharing a debt. In Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis,
Robert Young et al. analyze how the way in which the actions combine (to 
lead to the damage) alters the optimal apportionment of liability. They dis-
tinguish actions in series from actions in parallel.18 Actions in series need 
the involvement of all contributors, simultaneously, to provoke the damage; 
if one contributor does not act, the damage cannot occur. Actions in paral-
lel are actions that can lead to the damage independently of each other; 
each contributor can cause the damage alone through its own action. Our 
analysis adopts the following position.19
As indicated above, we restrict our attention to the efficiency of incen-
tives. We are seeking to find a sharing rule that can provide optimal incen-
tives to several decision makers who, by their actions, have the possibility 
of controlling the probability of a given damage occurring.
We choose to analyze a common situation whereby a provider of 
products/technologies is in a relationship with an industrial operator that 
uses these technologies within its production process. Although only the 
industrial operator’s activity can “directly” cause the damage, the upstream 
technical provider has an impact on the probability of the damage occurring 
because of its effort in the quality/reliability of the technology it provides 
(irrespective of the degree of prevention adopted by the regulator). In this 
sense, the technical provider can be considered an “indirect” contributor to 
the damage and has to receive optimal incentives to provide a technology 
of “good” quality.
16. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Joint Liability in Torts: Marginal and Inframarginal 
Efficiency, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 235 (1991); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW ch. 7 (1987); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determinants of Civ-
il Liability, 28 J. L. & ECON. 587 (1985); Robert Young et al., Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 111 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Multiple Tortfeasors]; Robert Young et al., 
Causality and Causation in Tort Law, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 507 (2004). 
17. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfea-
sors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989).
18. Young, Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 16.
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Considering the classification introduced by Miceli and Segerson and 
Young et al.,20 we observe that, to the best of our knowledge, this kind of 
situation has not been considered before. Our aim is to regulate levels of 
care (the agents are already engaged in their activities, which are supposed 
to be socially desirable). But in regard to the way their actions combine, the 
situation we consider is a new one: the industrial operator is both necessary 
and sufficient to cause the damage. Without this operator, no damage can 
occur (necessity), and its mere presence is sufficient to cause the damage, 
irrespective of the presence or not of the technical provider.21 The technical 
provider (hereinafter the “innovator”) is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
cause the damage; it cannot cause the damage alone, and the operator can 
cause the damage without it.
Another original aspect of our work is that it takes into account both 
the capacity of each agent to be financially unable to pay for damage 
caused (insolvency), and the market relationship which links the operator to 
the innovator. Since Steven Shavell’s, The Judgment Proof Problem, it has 
been well-established in the law and economic literature that the possibility 
of being insolvent can reduce the incentives to control the level of risk. 
When the amount of damages exceeds the financial capacity of the firm, 
the principle of limitation of liability prevents the firm from taking into ac-
count the whole damage it causes in its economic calculus.22 Hence its care 
effort will be insufficient.23 Insolvency in the case of multiple defendants is 
studied by Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz, but in a different 
framework. In their work, the decision-makers have an impact on the mag-
nitude of the damage (which occurs with certainty).24 Instead, we consider 
decision-makers that have the ability to reduce the probability of the dam-
age occurring.
Our contribution is also original in that it takes into account the mar-
ket relationship between the two injurers: the operator buys an input prod-
uct, or a productive technology, from the innovator. The price is a conse-
20. Miceli & Segerson, supra note 16; Young, Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 16, at 121.
21. This means that the industrial operator is able to operate without the technology provided by 
the provider. For instance, the operator owns a “basic technology,” and the technical provider offers an 
alternative technology or an upgrade of the basic technology. This assumption can be removed and the 
qualitative results remain the same: the operator would be only necessary, but no longer sufficient.
22. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
23. To illustrate, consider a firm with a financial capacity of $1 million. It can cause damage of 
$10 million. Because of limited liability, it only has to pay $1 million in case of an accident. From this 
firm’s point of view, this is as if it faced a damage of $1 million (and not $10 million). If the firm were 
endowed with a higher level of wealth, it could face a higher loss in case of an accident. This would 
provide incentives to make more effort to reduce the likelihood of this bad event.
24. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insol-
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quence of bargaining between the two actors. Depending on the intensity of 
competition on the research and development (“R&D”) market, bargaining 
power would tilt in favor of one actor or the other. If the innovator benefits 
from a monopoly position on the R&D market, it would be able to fix a 
high selling price (because it is the only existing provider). Conversely, if 
the innovator faces a large number of competitors on the R&D market, it 
would have to moderate its selling price to conclude the transaction (other-
wise, the operator could turn to other competitors). The innovator’s ability 
(or inability) to determine its selling price has an impact on the incentives 
to make efforts to improve the quality of the technology, and this degree of 
quality has an impact on the likelihood of damage occurring. So the sharing 
rule, which aims to provide all agents with optimal incentives to control the 
level of risk, has to take the characteristics of the R&D market into ac-
count.
Finally, our analysis is explicitly a normative one. We do not compare 
different existing rules of apportionment. We aim to define an optimal 
sharing rule, irrespective of any existing rule, but by taking important legal 
constraints into account, such as the limitation of liability. Our only objec-
tive is to define an optimal rule that provides each agent with optimal in-
centives to make optimal efforts to control the level of risk. Despite its 
novelty, the sharing rule we propose is intended to be easily applied, with-
out any drastic modification in the prevailing legal corpus.
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As a first step, we introduce the basic assumptions of our analysis be-
fore highlighting the two main originalities of our contribution: the possi-
bility for each injurer to be insolvent and the market relationship that links 
them.
A. Basic Assumptions
We consider the case of two firms. The first one is an industrial opera-
tor, denoted by . The operator is engaged in an industrial activity that can 
cause damage to third parties and/or the environment. The magnitude of the 
potential damage is given by . The operator is endowed with a basic 
productive technology, but it has the possibility of buying a new one from 
an innovator, denoted by I. This new technology is more reliable and re-
duces the probability of an accident occurring.
More precisely, the probability of a damage occurring is denoted 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 119 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:19 PM
666 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
tor, and an effort in R&D, , which is adopted by the innovator and which 
determines the degree of technical performance of the technology. The 
higher , the lower probability : . The same property 
holds with R&D: . But the efficiency of and in reducing the 
probability is decreasing: , . The following specifi-
cation satisfies these properties: , with 
and . We use this specification for our theoretical analysis 
and to calibrate the numerical calculus we provide later. The operator is ini-
tially endowed with a technology with a degree 0 of technical performance 
( ), but it has the possibility of buying from the innovator a more ad-
vanced technology ( ). To exercise a care effort, as well as an effort in 
R&D, is costly: the total cost of applying a given level of care is , and 
the total cost of applying a given level of R&D is .
Each firm is endowed with a level of wealth, and , respectively 
for the operator and the innovator, from which the damages will be fi-
nanced in case of accident. We suppose that entering in activity allows a
firm perceiving a revenue , , from which it can finance its R&D 
activities (firm ), its prevention activities or the purchase of a new tech-
nology (firm ). We suppose that no firm is able, alone, to pay for the total 
damage: , . Each firm is subject to an insolvency con-
straint. However, we assume that, taken together, both firms have sufficient 
wealth to pay for the overall damage25: . So the relevant 
question is how to share in order to provide both firms with optimal in-
centives to exercise care and R&D in order to optimally control the level of 
risk.
Finally, we assume that strict liability holds. This allows us to simplify 
the analysis and thus to focus our attention on finding the optimal sharing 
rule. We set aside the issue of fairness in the apportionment, which could 
take place with a negligence rule (e.g., by taking into account the relative 
degree of negligence of each injurer). Moreover, with regards to damage to 
the environment and/or the presence of “high risks,” strict liability tends to 
become the default liability rule.26
25. We assume that the two firms are sufficiently wealthy to repair the total damage (when 
taken together): victims are fully compensated. This choice is an arbitrary one (it serves to lighten the 
calculus). However, the sum of the total damages to be paid could be different from , and the qualita-
tive results should not be affected.
26. In the United States, strict liability holds under CERCLA. Shavell illustrates the increasing 
use of strict liability in the case of “abnormally dangerous” damage and in the case of “ultrahazardous” 
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Now we introduce our particular scheme of liability sharing.
B. Apportioning Liability Under Insolvency
Because of individual insolvency constraints ( ), there 
are constraints on the liability sharing: each agent cannot pay more than its 
financial capacity. As a consequence, if we denote as and the 
amount in damages to be paid respectively by the operator and the innova-
tor, we have to take into account the following constraints: 
.
The liability scheme can be illustrated by the following figure.
Figure 1: apportionment under individual insolvencies
The top of the figure highlights damages to be paid by the operator, 
with a reading from right to left. Damages to be paid by the innovator are 
represented at the bottom, from left to right. For a good understanding of 
how this sharing rule works, we consider the following illustration.
Because of the limited liability constraint, the maximum amount in 
damages that can be claimed from the innovator is . As a consequence, 
the minimum amount in damages that will be claimed from the operator is 
the complement (highlighted by the dotted line on the right). Ap-
plying similar reasoning, we can say that the minimum amount in damages 
that will be claimed from the innovator is (dotted line on the left). 
Because of individual constraints of limited liability, these two amounts are 
incompressible. As a consequence, the amount of debt to be shared is:
Put differently, when considering the total amount of damages to be 
paid, but abstracting from the minimum (and incompressible) amounts in 
damages, the “sharing zone” is restricted to , which corre-
JOHN FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 15–18, 97 (9th ed. 1998)); see also W.P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
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sponds to the total wealth over the amount of damage to be remedied. So it 
is only to this sharing zone that our sharing rule will apply.
As a consequence, the amounts in damages to be paid by each agent 
are:
With the share of “sharing zone” which is attributed to the innova-
tor, and the share attributed to the operator, takes values between 
0 and 1. It is important to keep in mind that the apportionment only applies 
to the sharing zone: hence, does not mean that each firm pays for 
one half of the total damage , but that they each pay for one half of the 
“sharing zone”. Below highlights the originality of our sharing rule with 
respect to existing rules of apportionment.
The different rules currently enforced often define the apportionment 
relative to the contribution of each agent to the overall damage. In our case,
the magnitude of is given and is independent from the actions decided by 
the agents (recall that the agent can alter the probability of the damage oc-
curring, not its magnitude). So we cannot define a sharing rule based on the 
individual relative contributions to the damage. Moreover, is defined in a 
specific manner, taking into account individual insolvency constraints; 
these constraints are ex ante explicitly taken into account. This is very dif-
ferent from the current functioning of the liability system where the agents 
are a priori liable for a given share of the damage (according to criteria 
based on the relative contribution on the damage) but, ex post, they can es-
cape from paying their share of liability thanks to insolvency (what is re-
ferred to as “judgment-proofness” in the literature). Here, such a mecha-
nism is excluded: a priori and a posteriori payments are known and 
identical.27
Now that our rule of apportionment is presented, we have to determine 
the optimal value of , so as to provide optimal incentives for prevention 
( ) and innovation ( ) in order to “properly” control the level of the risk of 
27. In case of joint and several liability it is possible for an agent to be financially unable to pay 
for its a priori share of liability. In that case, the remaining damages are passed on to another solvent 
agent. In our system of liability, an agent with a low level of solvency will pay for a low share of the 
common debt. But there is no “one for one” relationship between the (in)solvency of one agent, and the 
remaining debt attributed to the other agent. Technically, a change in or in leads to the defi-
nition of a new value of There is not necessarily a transfer of “one for one” between the two agents 
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damage. For this, we first have to define the optimal situation, and then to 
set in such a way as to reach this situation.
C. First Best Situation
In economic analyses, it is usually recognized that optimality—or, 
equivalently, a “first-best” situation—consists of reaching the maximum 
level of social welfare. Social welfare is defined as the sum of all individu-
al welfares. In our case, this corresponds to the sum of the individual prof-
its of the operator and the innovator, minus the level of the risk of damage 
borne by third parties. So the definition of optimality responds to the fol-
lowing problem:
in our illustration.
We have to find the values of and which maximize this social wel-
fare function.
So, optimality comes from a hypothetical situation where all interests 
and costs are taken into account by an “omniscient, omnipotent and benev-
olent dictator,” who aims to maximize the global welfare of society. This 
“ideal” situation is used as a benchmark toward which we should strive.
The socially optimal values for and (which we respectively denote 
and ) are:28
We verify that the higher the level of damage , the higher the opti-
mal values of prevention and innovation. The higher the cost of preven-
tion (respectively, the cost of innovation), the lower the optimal value of 
prevention (respectively, innovation).
28. These values are derived by using the classical method of finding the first-order conditions 
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At the optimum, the probability of causing an accident should be: 
The higher the level of damage, the lower the probability should be. 
The higher the cost of making efforts on care and/or in innovation, the low-
er the social values for prevention and/or innovation and, as a consequence, 
the higher the socially optimal value of the probability of an accident oc-
curring.
In reality, of course, no such a dictator exists. Reality involves several 
private agents, facing their own constraints and wanting to maximize their 
own objectives. The aim of the public regulator is thus to enforce a policy 
in such a way as to come as close as possible to the optimal situation, but 
taking into account the private behaviors of firms.
To determine the optimal value of the sharing rule , we have to 
properly define all the private interests of both agents, and . So we have 
to define the market relationship that links them to each other.
D.  Two Defendants Linked by a Market Relationship
We know that the operator has the possibility of buying a new produc-
tion technology from the innovator. More precisely, the relationship be-
tween the two agents can be summarized in the following manner.
Figure 2. Schedule of individual decisions
Step 2:  decides on its innovation effort
Step 1: public authority fixes the sharing rule
, which is common knowledge
Step 3: TRANSACTION between and :
buys a new technology, for a price
Step 5: in case of damage, each agent pays 
for its share of liability: and 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 122 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:19 PM
2016] LIABILITY APPORTIONMENT AMONG TORTFEASORS 671
The optimal value of the sharing rule , which is denoted by , has to 
be known before any private decision-making. The two private actors, 
and , will make their private decisions (in order to maximize their own 
profit) in light of the rule .
Moreover, the transaction between the two agents (step 3, figure 2) al-
so has an influence on their decision-making: the selling price of the new 
technology alters the incentives of the innovator to design a more or less 
reliable technology. The selling price is the result of a bargain between 
and . The outcome of the bargain depends on the degree of competition 
on the R&D market (the market on which the firm is located). Two ex-
treme cases can be considered:
(i) The R&D market is a perfectly competitive one. In that case, firm 
faces a multitude of competitors, who can also supply firm . Firm 
has no freedom in fixing its selling price; it has to be in line with the 
most efficient competitor (otherwise, it cannot “win the contract”). 
Suppose that the selling price offered by the most efficient competitor 
is .
(ii) The R&D market is a monopolistic one. Firm is the only one to offer 
new production technology, and it has the possibility of fixing its own 
selling price. The only constraint it faces is firm having an interest 
in buying its new technology. So, firm will fix the maximum selling 
price, to which firm is indifferent on whether to buy the new tech-
nology or not—the selling price is equal to the benefit firm can en-
joy from using the new technology (in terms of decreasing the proba-
bility of an accident occurring and paying :
with being the decrease in the probability of an ac-
cident when using the new technology (with a degree of technical ad-
vancement of ) instead of the basic technology (with a degree of 
technical advancement of 0).
These two examples are the two extreme cases that can be encoun-
tered on a market. But between them, there is a continuum of intermediate 
degrees of competition. As a result, denoting as the degree of competition 
on the R&D market ( means no competition (i.e., a monopoly); 
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This price, which depends on the degree of competition (which deter-
mines the relative bargaining power of each firm), reduces the profit of the 
operator and increases the profit of the innovator. We remark that in all 
cases except perfect competition, price increases with : the higher 
the technical advancement of the new technology, the higher its selling 
price.29 So this selling price has an impact on the incentives to provide an 
R&D effort. Moreover, the lower the degree of competition on the R&D 
market (lower ), the higher the sensitivity of to the level of . Thus, 
through the bargaining which takes place between the two firms to fix 
, the degree of competition has an impact on the incentives to inno-
vate.
Now that our framework and the social benchmark is outlined, we will 
define the optimal sharing rule and discuss the possible policy implications.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we first present our theoretical results. Then we pro-
vide a numerical example in order to illustrate how the sharing rule could 
apply.
A. Theoretical Predictions
To determine the optimal value of , i.e. the value which maximizes 
social welfare given the fact that each firm pursues its own private interest, 
we first have to determine the private decisions made by the firms. To do 
so, we use the methodology of backward induction: we determine the last 
decision of the schedule (other decisions and parameters being given), and 
then roll back the schedule to determine the upstream decisions (the down-
stream decisions being known and given).
As a first step, we have to determine how the operator chooses its lev-
el of effort, , for a given production technology (with a given degree of 
advancement ). The operator has to find the value of which maximizes 
its private profit:
29. increases with the level of , because is de-
creasing in . The higher the degree of technical advancement, the more reliable the new technology 
(the lower the probability of causing a damage). So, the expected cost of having to pay decreases 
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with, in our example, and
. The value of which maximizes the operator’s private 
profit is:
We can easily check that: because . As a conse-
quence, whatever the sharing rule , insufficient incentives for care will be 
provided. This problem is well known in law and economics, especially 
since the work of Shavell.30 Because of limited liability, the operator does 
not take into account the entire damage its activity causes to society. As a 
consequence, it does not perceive the whole social benefit of care in terms 
of reducing the level of risk of accident. Nevertheless, because de-
creases in —recall that is the portion of the “sharing zone” which is at-
tributed to the innovator ( ) is attributed to the operator)—the lower 
the value of , the higher the value of .
In a second step, being defined and given, we have to analyze how 
the innovator determines its effort in terms of innovation. Its effort is de-
termined in such a way as to maximize its private profit:
with, in our example, ,
and
.
The value of which maximizes the operator’s private profit 
is:
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Two remarks can be made. First, for a given degree of competition 
different from 0 (i.e., except the case of a monopoly), it is easy to check 
that we have (because of ). We also observe 
that the higher , the higher the effort provided in innovation. The intuition 
is very simple: a higher means a higher degree of liability in case of acci-
dent, so the incentives to provide efforts aiming to reduce the likelihood of 
damage occurring are strengthened. We can also remark that in a case of a 
monopoly ( ), the private innovation effort equals the socially optimal 
one, whatever the sharing rule : . The intuition is as follows: in a 
case of monopoly, the innovator can fix the maximum selling price, 
, which is equal to the (whole) benefit 
the innovation provides to the operator in terms of improving the efficiency 
of prevention measures, , to reduce the likelihood of damage occurring.
All these results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The Incentives Proposition
Consider two firms, both having an impact on the probability of a 
common damage occurring.
I. Sharing liability between the two firms does not lead to an op-
timal level of effort from the operator (the agent downstream);
II. When there is a strictly positive degree of competition on the 
innovation market (where the upstream agent works), sharing 
liability does not lead to an optimal level of innovation;
III. The higher the degree of liability for an agent, the higher the 
effort it provides; and
IV. In the case of a monopoly on the innovation market, an opti-
mal level of innovation is provided, whatever the apportion-
ment of liability.
We have determined how the private efforts are chosen. Now, with 
these elements in mind, we are able to determine the optimal value of . As 
mentioned above, we focus our analysis on the issue of providing optimal 
incentives to “properly” control the level of risk. So we need to find the 
value of that maximizes social welfare, taking into account the way in 
which the private agents choose their level of effort. So the optimal value 
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With:
We find the following results below.
Proposition 2: The Optimal Apportionment Proposition
The optimal apportionment of liability between the two firms depends 
on the degree of competition on the R&D market.
I. If the innovator benefits from a monopoly position ( ), it 
has to assume the minimum share of liability (i.e. ,
). A maximum share of liability is assigned 
to the operator: .
II. For all other degrees of competition (i.e. ), there is an 
optimal apportionment if the following conditions 
are met:
a. is higher than 
b. The level of individual wealth and are suffi-
ciently high.31
Point (I) of Proposition 2 can easily be deducted from Proposition 1: 
because the power of the monopoly allows the innovator to perceive the 
whole social benefit from its innovation (so that it receives optimal incen-
tives to invest in R&D), the only problem is the presence of suboptimal in-
centives for the operator for risk prevention. As a consequence, maximum 
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incentives have to be provided to the operator, via the setting of the maxi-
mum degree of liability: , so as to obtain .
Point (ii) of Proposition 2 teaches us that for an interior solution to ex-
ist (i.e. a value of which is different from 0 and 1), it is necessary for the 
efficiency-cost ratio of prevention (i.e. ) to be sufficiently higher than 
that of innovation (i.e. ). Given that takes a value in [0,1], we know 
that takes a value in [0, 1/3]. As a consequence, if the efficiency-
cost ratio of prevention is equal to the efficiency-cost ratio of innovation, 
this necessary condition is satisfied. Point (ii) also teaches us that an interi-
or solution requires conditions regarding the firms’ wealth to be satisfied. 
The intuition is as follows: first, it is necessary for the wealth to be suffi-
ciently high to exceed the overall damage. The higher the sum of the indi-
vidual wealth, the higher the “sharing zone” defined in section III.B su-
pra.32 Second, having an optimal value of different from 0 and 1 means 
that the situation requires “balanced incentives” to be provided; there is no 
need to provide maximum incentives to one agent (and minimum incen-
tives to the other one). In other words, the lack of incentives is similar for 
the two agents. All else being equal, incentives are provided through the 
size of the wealth; the more an agent can lose in case of accident, the high-
er the incentives to avoid the accident. So, all else being equal, the more 
similar the agents’ wealth, the more balanced (between the two agents) the 
incentives to be provided.
Finally, it is worth developing a numerical illustration. It allows us to 
test for the application of such a policy (within different situations), and al-
so to see how the performance of the regulation evolves when the degree of 
competition on the R&D market varies.
B. Numerical Illustration
For a given set of parameters, we calculate the private efforts in care 
and R&D (and the corresponding level of social welfare), depending on the 
sharing rule . Thereby we deduce the optimal value of (which induces 
the maximum level of social welfare). Then, we seek how the optimal shar-
ing rule varies when the degree of competition on the R&D market chang-
es.
The basic case we study is the following:
32. If the sum of the two sets of wealth and is just equal to the amount of damage , the 
sharing zone equals 0: each firm is liquidated to pay for the liability, and the amount to be paid in dam-
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1000
For that specific case, the optimal apportionment of liability is: 
. This means that it is optimal to allocate 65.3% of the sharing zone 
to the innovator, and 34.7% to the operator.
Given these different elements, the minimum amount in damages the 
operator has to pay is: , the innovator has 
to pay: , and the sharing zone is: 
.
It follows that the optimal amount in damages the operator has to pay 
is: 400 + 0.347*900 = 712.3, i.e. 50.88% of the total damage , and the op-
timal amount in damages the innovator has to pay is: 100 + 0.653*900 = 
687.7, i.e. 49.12% of the total damage .
We then calculate how the optimal apportionment reacts when the 
degree of competition on the R&D market changes.
We find that the lower (respectively higher) the degree of competition 
on the R&D market, the lower (respectively higher) the degree of liability 
to assign to the innovator. This result is a consequence of Point (I) of Prop-
osition 2: in case of a monopoly on the R&D market, the innovator has op-
timal incentives to innovate. Starting from this point, a higher degree of 
competition on the R&D market prevents the innovator from fixing a high 
selling price for its technology and, above all, from making the price de-
pendent on the innovation effort. This leads to lower incentives to innovate, 
which have to be compensated by a higher degree of liability for the inno-
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Figure 3. Optimal sharing rule and share of global liability ( )
depending on the degree of competition 
A higher degree of competition on the R&D market (a higher value of 
, on the x-axis) is associated with a higher value of (the black solid
line), meaning that the share of liability assigned on the operator decreases 
( , the grey dashed line).
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our analysis aims to propose a rule of apportionment of liability in or-
der to regulate frequent situations in which two actors, with low levels of 
solvency, have an impact on the likelihood of a common damage occurring. 
Each actor, via its decision, alters the probability of an accident occurring. 
Moreover, the two actors are linked by a market relationship, as one actor 
provides a production technology to the other (and the reliability of this 
technology has an impact on the ability to “properly” control the level of 
risk).
The originality of our work is twofold. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to analyze this kind of situation. Second, 
our originality also lies in our adoption of a normative perspective. We do 
not propose a comparison between existing rules of apportionment (such as 
joint and several liability and non-joint liability), but instead propose a new 
rule, regardless of the existing ones, which aims to provide optimal incen-
tives for controlling the risk of damage. Nevertheless, in order to ensure a 
potential application, we take into account important practical “con-
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The rule of apportionment we suggest has no equivalent in practice. 
We highlight the fact that the nature of the market relationship which links 
the two agents is a key factor in the definition of the optimal sharing rule. 
We specifically show that in the case of a monopoly on the R&D market 
(upstream agent / provider), a minimum liability has to be assigned to the 
innovator since its market power provides sufficient incentives to provide a 
“high-quality” technology (via the ability to fix a high selling price). When 
a higher degree of competition holds on this market, the optimal appor-
tionment depends on the ratio of efficiency/cost of prevention and R&D, 
and on individual relative wealth. Nevertheless, all else being equal, a 
higher degree of competition on the R&D market calls for a higher degree 
of liability for the innovator.
This result leads to at least two remarks. We show that on a monopo-
listic R&D market, efficiency calls for a minimum liability for the innova-
tor. This result could be used in combination with the rationale of the pa-
tent system, which gives an innovator a monopolistic position, in such a 
way as to foster the incentives provided by this system. The importance of 
the degree of competition in the definition of the optimal apportionment of 
liability leads to another policy implication. Our result suggests that, all 
else being equal, a variation in the degree of competition on the R&D mar-
ket leads to a variation in the optimal apportionment of liability. Thus, hav-
ing knowledge about the degree of competition on this market is a neces-
sary condition to properly configure the liability system. Our result thus 
calls for collaboration between the competition authorities, which have suf-
ficient expertise to assess the degree of competition, and the legislatures 
and courts. Here, the fundamental idea is to build a “liability formula” 
which gives the amount to be paid for liability by each defendant. This 
formula depends on different parameters such as the relative efficiency/cost 
ratios (of care and R&D), the amounts of assets, and the overall damage 
and the degree of competition on the market. This formula, which should 
be common knowledge (in order to provide ex ante incentives), would be 
used ex post by the courts to establish liability. The competition authority’s 
expertise should be necessary ex ante and ex post. Ex ante, its expertise is 
needed to determine this formula (i.e., the way in which competition affects 
the incentives). Ex post, in case of damage, its expertise is needed to assess 
the degree of competition on the relevant market (thus allowing a calcula-
tion of the amounts in damages to be claimed). This necessity for collabo-
ration is also extended to regulation agencies, since the optimal apportion-
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Our analysis, like any exploratory study, is built on simple and strong 
assumptions that should be removed in further analyses. Our results have to 
be interpreted in the light of these assumptions. Assuming strict liability 
allows us to set aside the issues related to fairness in the apportionment of 
debt. Such an assumption simplifies the analysis but, from a practical point 
of view, could be justified by the fact that strict liability is increasingly 
used in environmental damage cases and for controlling highly hazardous 
activities—which are the activities we had in mind when developing our 
analysis. However, other assumptions should be removed and thus call for
further studies. For instance, we greatly simplify the analysis when we as-
sume that R&D activities always (and rapidly) succeed in improving the 
technology. We know that R&D activities are highly uncertain, and the 
possible benefits can be earned within a medium/long-term perspective. 
Conversely, prevention activities have an impact in the short term, and their 
efficiency is less uncertain. Nevertheless, R&D activities have an impact 
on the technological trajectory, i.e. on the long-run ability of preventive 
measures to reduce the level of risk. So their overall long-run impact may 
be higher than the benefit of providing a higher level of prevention, but 
with a “less advanced” technology. As a consequence, the trade-off be-
tween prevention and R&D calls for a broader analysis of certain short-
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
Point (II) can be demonstrated in the following manner:
To lighten the calculations, we directly search for an optimal value of 
, the amount in damages to be paid by the operator. We just have to keep 
in mind that only takes values in . Then, with the value of 
, it is easy to find the corresponding value of :
The optimal value of maximizes social welfare, taking into ac-
count the private levels of efforts. 
With:
The first order condition, , is:
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Dividing by , the condition can be rewritten:
,with
This first order condition is a third-degree equation in , which we 
denote .
Differentiating leads to a second-degree polynomial:
whose discriminant is: .
The discriminant is of the sign of .
We can deduce that for , is always non negative, 
and so is an increasing function with a unique root. So before 
the function increases, and decreases after : is the unique max-
imize of .
Now we have to take into account the constraints on the value of .
We know that takes only values in . As a consequence:
If the optimal value of is lower than , this means that a 
minimum liability has to be assigned to the operator and we obtain: 
. This situation is not optimal, but because of the limited liability 
principle, we can only obtain this “second best” choice.
If the optimal value of is higher than , this means that a maxi-
mum liability has to be assigned to the operator and we obtain: .
This situation is not optimal, but because of the limited liability principle, 
we can only obtain this “second best” choice.
So, we look at the conditions which ensure an interior solution, i.e. an 
optimal value of which lies in . For this, let us define:
, i.e. the maximum payment in damages the operator can 
bear (its wealth, ), expressed as a percentage of the overall damage .
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, i.e. the remaining amount of damage (which remains to 
be remedied) when a maximum liability is assigned to the innovator (
), expressed as a percentage of the overall damage . This allows us to 
rewrite: 
To obtain requires the following condition to be 
satisfied:
which is equivalent to:
We observe that:
is decreasing in , and 
is increasing in So the condition is 
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